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No. 12106
IN THE SUPREME COURI'

of the

STATE OF UI'AH

THE STATE OF UI'AH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

)
)

)
)

)

01ARLES EIGILER,

Defendant and Appellant.

)
)
)

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

This is an appeal fran an order dated April 6,
1970 of the District Court of the First Judicial

District of the State of Utah in and for the County
of Cache ordering revocation of probation of Charles
Henry

Eichler on convictions of forgery and second

degree burglary because of an alleged violation of

Cache County and Box Elder County probation agreerrents.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The f olla.ving facts are taken f rorn the rep:>rter' s transcript of proceedings in criminal
actions No. 1497 and 1499 in the District Court
of the First Judicial District of the State of
Utah in and for the County of Cache, and the
transcript of proceedings in criminal action
No. 1216-17 in the District Court of the First

Judicial District of the State of Utah in and for
the Cowity of Box Elder:
Charles H. Eichler, defendant and appellant
herein, was arraigned before the Honorable ledis
Jones, District Judge, in the District Court of
cache Cotmty on the 14th day of April 1969, wherein appellant was represented by H. Preston Thanas,
Esquire, on the charges of forgery and second
degree burglary.

Appellant pled guilty to the

charge of forgery and not guilty to the charge of
second degree burglary.

On the 16th day of April

3

1969 appellant, represented by L. Brent Hoggan,
Esquire, appeared before Judge Jones who pronounced a sentence of indetenninate tenn of not
less than one year and not rrore than 20 years in
the Utah State Prison, granting, however, a stay

of execution upon the condition that appellant
serve an indetenninate term in the county jail

and, up:m his release, that he be placed upon
probation.
On the 27th day of May 1969 appellant again
apreared before Judge Jones, now in the District
Court of Box Elder County.
by counsel.

He was not represented

Appellant pled gUilty to a charge of

seoond degree burglary and having expressed a
desire to have sentence pronounced at that ti.Ire,
he was sentenced by Judge Jones to serve not less

than one year and not rrore than 20 years in the

Utah State Prison, granting, however, a stay of
execution upon the condition that appellant serve

4

an indeterr.Unate term of not less than six rronths
in

the Box Elder County jail and then be placed

up:m

probation for two years.

Judge Jones further

ordered revocation of the cache County probation
agreerrent, directing that the Cache County sentence
be

ordered into execution, to be served in the Box

Elder County jail concurrently with the Box Elder

County sentence.

Appellant was rerranded to the

custody of the Box Elder County Sheriff to serve
a minimum of six rronths in the Box Elder County
jail.

Upon serving the tine required, appellant

was released f ran the Box Elder County jail on
probation.
On March 16, 1970 appellant appeared before
the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, District Judge
in and for the County of Cache, on a hearing based

upon an affidavit of John Holmes, probation officer,

alleging probation violation.

Appellant appeared

in person, not represented by counsel.

Upon a

5.

specific request of appellant to obtain a court
appointed lawyer, Judge Christoffersen refused
the request.

The hearing was continued until

April 6, 1970 while appellant remained in custody
in the Cache County jail, whereupon appellant was
folilld in violation of two separate probation
agreements, one originating in Cache County, the
other originating in Box Elder County.

The court

revoked the two probations and stays of execution,
ordering appellant incarcerated in the Utah.State
Prison for a period of fran one to twenty years,
both sentences to run concurrently.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court on
review vacate the probation revocation ordered by
the District Court of Cache County and reinstate
the probation.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

THE APPELIANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT 'IO

6
COUNSEL AT HIS PROBATION REVCCATION llEARING

:m

VIOLA'l'ION OF Tl!E SIXTII A."ID FOURI'EENTH AMENDMENTS
'ID 'l'l:l.L CONSTITU'I'ION OF THE UNITED STATES.
II •

Tllli DISTIUCT COURT IN AND FOR CAQIE

COUNTY ERRED IN RI:.VOKING TI-ill CAOIE COUNTY PROBATION
AGREEME:.'IT A."ID INCARCERATlliG APPELLANT, SINCE SAID

PROBA'l'ION AGREEMENI' HAD BEEN TERMINATED PREVIOUSLY
J3Y ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURI' lli Al.'ID FOR BOX ELDER
COUNTY.

III •

THE DISTIUCT COURT lli AND FOR CACHE COUNTY

DID NOI' HAVE JURISDICTION 'ID HEAR THE ALLEGED
VIOIATION OF A OOX ELDER PROBATION AGREEMENl'.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT 'ID COUNSEL
AT HIS PIDBATION REVOCATION HEARING IN VIOLATION OF
THE SIXTH AND FOURI'EENTH AMENIMENTS

'ID THE CONSTI-

'IUI'ION OF THE UNITED STATES.

On March 16, 1970, District Judge VeNcy

7

cli.ristoffersen conducted a hearing on an alleged
violation of probation for the appellant, Charles
Henry I.:ichler.

(Cache Co. Tr. 12).

During the

course of the probation revocation hearing the
linpecW1ious (R. 3)

Eichler specifically re-

quested court-appointed oounsel, but his request
was

denied:
.Mr. Eichler:
The Court:

Could I get an appointed lav.yer?
Not on a probation revocation.
If this were another charge I
would appoint one for you to
defend the charge, but this is
on probation revocation, and in
view of the Appeals Court, the
Federal Court of Appeals in
response to Mr. Ritter's require. ment, I think that that's been
overruled, and I don't see a
necessity on revocation, parole
violation or probation revocation,
to provide court-appointed oounsel.
(Cache Co. Tr. 17).

In view of the decisions of the United States
Court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, appellant contends that the
first District Court in and for cache County improperly withheld his constitutional right to counsel.
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The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of

v. Wainwright, 372

u.S.

335 (1963) , held the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
the right to counsel applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

The present case presents the precise

question of whether the right to counsel arising
under the United States Constitution is applicable

to a hearing on probation revocation before a
District Court of the State of Utah.
Recently the United States Supreme Court held
that, as a matter of federal constitutional law,

an individual is entitled to be represented by
counsel whether the proceedings are labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing.
--·-

Rhay,
--·-

389 U.S. 128 (1967), which was given

retroactive effect in McConnell v.
2

(1968) .

393 U.S.

Mernpa 1 s conviction for the

offense of "joyridding," he was placed on probation
for two years on the oondition, arrong others, that

9

he spend thirty days in the county jail.

The

imfOsition of sentence was deferred pursuant to
a

state statute.

About four nunths

later, Mempa's probation was revoked at a hearing
at which he was not represented by counsel.

at 130-31.

Nempa,

In a canpanion case which was

consoliaated for purposes of argurrent, petitioner
i'lalkling, following his conviction for second
degree burglary, was placed on probation for three
years, the .imposition of sentence being deferred
pursuant to the sarre statute.

As

a condition of

probation, Walkling was required to serve ninety
days in the county jail and to make restitution.
At his hearing for probation revocation, he requested a continuance to enable him to retain
coW1sel and was granted a week.

However, the

follO\ving week Walkling appeared without a laW'Jer.
'l'he court went ahead with the hearing in the
absence of petitioner's counsel.

He was not

10

offered counsel, nor would he have been appointed
oounsel had he requested it.

l:-ie.?pa, supra at 132.

In holding that both petitioners' Sixth Amendrrent

guarantee of right to counsel had been denied, the
United States Suprerne Court stated:
[A]pr=oinbrent of counsel for an indigent is
required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a
criminal accused may be affected.
Mempa, supra at 134.
[2\] lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of
probation or a deferred sentencing.
supra at 137.

The probationary status is a part of the
sentencing process since "substantiaX'rights may
be affected through hearings involving revocation

of that probation.

If the probation agreerrent,

which is part of the sentence, is to be altered in
such a way as to affect the "substantial" rights,
then the constitutional guarantee of a right to
counsel must be met.
The United States Court of Appeals for the

11
'i'entll Circuit neld in Alverez v. Turner, 422 F. 2d

214 (10th Cir. 1970), that the denial of a request
for court appointed-counsel in a probation revoca-

tion hearing is a clear abuse of a federal constitutional right.

The court carefully made the

distinction between the probation revocation of
Melany and the

violations of the other

petitioners :
In No. 580, the appellee Melany alleged
in his original petition ••• that he had
l:.een denied the assistance of counsel at. the
proceedings that had resulted in the
revocation of his probation.

*

*

*

The trial court
granted relief to
on the additional round [sic.] that he
in 0e probation reyocation hearing. Such denial is a clear abuse
of-a--federal-cons-titutional right. Mempa v.
_@)__il,
-;-gfven retroactive ef fect1n
v.

Rhay,

393

u.s.

2, 89

s.ct .. 32,

21 L.Ed.2d 2. The judgrrent in No. 580 is thus
affinned.
su}2_ra at 220-21 (emphasis added).
Ho.vever, the court noted that, unlike probation
revocation hearings, proceedings for parole revocation were not judicial ,proceedings and hence
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were not a part of the sentencing process which

require court appointed counsel.

Alverez, supra

at 220-21.

The Utah Suprerre Court, in a decision prior
to the

__

Case, intimated in dicta that the
did not hold that counsel was required

at a hearing for probation revocation.

Beal v.

22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P. 2d 624 (1969) •

The

dicta in Deal confined the Eeq:>a ruling to the
facts, contending that the decision must be.read
in light of the Washington statutes providing for
deferred sentencing.

Beal, supra at 625.

The

decision apparently concluded that the proceedings
for probation revocation are not a part of the
judicial proceedings" of a case:
Hnen a defendant has been tried and convicted
and sentenced, and no appeal or other proceedings are pending to test the propriety of the
guilty verdict, then the critical states of
the proceeding are over, and the defendant
has no constitutional rights to be placed on
probation or parole.
Beal, supra at 626.

-·- ---
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It is frequently difficult to determine the
exact scope of a Unite<..1 States Supreme Court decision such as the Mempa_ Ca_::;e, particularly where
federal constitutional rights are made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendrrent.
It

becares necessary, therefore, to examine sub-

sequent decisions which interpret the holding of
the United States Supren-e Court on a particular

issue.
The rrost recent pronouncerrent of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
within which Utah is situated, is Alverez v.
The court in that case specifically
held that denial of counsel at the judicial pro-

ceedings that resulted in the revocation of his
probation was a "clear abuse of a federal constitutional right,"

supra at 220-21, conT

eluding that a hearing for revocation of probation,
regardless of whether or not it involves a deferred
sentencing procedure, requires that the accused be

14
afforded counsel.
The probation revocation in this case was
effectuated in open court after the presentation
of evidence by the state's attorney.

Appellant

asked for counsel but was denied, thus rendering

appellant helpless to refute improper testimony
or challenge its admissibility.

Without counsel

t.'1e substantial rights of an individual in his
probation revocation hearing are open to abuse.
Unlike a parolee 'Who is responsible to the Parole
Board, an administrative body, the probationer
falls under not only the jurisdiction of the
probation officer, but also the jurisdiction of
the court.

It is only the latter relationship

which the law demands that counsel be provided.
Justice requires that even the indigent be
entitled to representation 'When his substantial
rights are to be affected.
POINT II

THE DISTRICT COURI' IN AND FOR CArnE COUNTY
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J:,RRJ:;D IN RLVOKil'iG THE CACHE COUNTY PROBATION
..'NT ANTI INCARCERATING APPELI.ANI', SINCE SAID

PROBATION

HAD BEEN TERMINATED PREVIOUSLY

BY ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN l\ND FOR BOX El.DER
COUN'IY.

On

April 6, 1970 the defendant api;ieared l::>efore

the District Court of Cache County wherein an affi-

davit was filed alleging that he had violated two
separate probation agreerrents, one executed in
Cache County and one executed in Box Elder County.
(Cache Co. Tr. 17-18).

After hearing the state's

evidence the District Court concluded that the
defendant had in fact violated the terms of both
probation agreements and, accordingly, withdrew
the stays of execution and revoked the two separate
prolJations, ordering the defendant to be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for a i;ieriod of frau
one to twenty years on each violation.
Tr. 18-24).

(Cache Co.

The sentences were to run concurrently.

(Cache Co. Tr. 24) •
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ll<:Mever, prior to the aforesaid action of the
District Court of Cache County, the District Court
in oox Elder County, on May 27, 1969, revoked or
tenninated the Cache County probation agreerrent:
The Court:

(tr.

Eichler:

The Court:

. . I propose to revoke the
probation over in Log'an [Cache
Collilty] with your consent here
and sentence you to serve a
period in the Box Elder County
jail concurrent with that in
Legan. Now you've got to consent to that.
Alright.
Alright, the probation is revoked in the Legan matter, the
sentence is ordered into execution, but the sentence is to be
served in the Box Elder County
jail concurrent with the one I'm
going to impose on you nCJ.N.
(I3ox Elder Co. Tr. 3).

The defendant was thus convicted of violating the
Cache County probation agreerrent which had previously
been terminated by the District Court of
County.

Box

Elder

Certainly, the appellant cannot be impris-

oned for a violation of a probation agreerrentwhich
the court itself previously rendered void.
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POI:NT III
'11IE DISTRICT COURT In l\ND FDR CACHE COlli"l'Y

DID NCJr HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE ALLEGED
VIOIA'l'ION OF A BOX ELDEH. PROBATION

Because the Cache County probation agrce.--rent
had been terminated prior to the probation revocation hearing in Cache County, the sole question is
whether the Cache County District Court had jurisdiction to hold a hearing on an alleged violation
of the remaining probation agreement of Box Elder
County.
The Constitution of the State of Utah in dividiny tl1e state into Judicial Districts specifically
provides that:
All civil and criminal business arising in any
county must be tried in such county unless a
change of venue be taken in such cases as may
be provided by law.
Utah Cons. Art. VIII §5.
Further, Utah Code Annotated 77-8-1 provides that
the jurisdiction for criminal offenses ushall be
in the county in which the offense is consumnated."

18
'i'nc Utcih Suprcrne Court held in ?tate v. Cox, 147

p. 2d 853 (1944) that:

The jurisliiction is determined by the County
and not by the filstrict it is in . . . . Thus
it is evicient that t.11ere is no district court
w:1ich covers the whole district but only a
district court for each county and its territorial jurisdiction is within the boundaries
of the county.
Sta_te v.
supra at 860, 861.
The only probation agreerrent remaining in

force at the time of the Cache County probation
revocation hearing was the agreerrent executed pursuant to the District Court of Box Elder County order.
Therefore, the District Court of Box Elder County,
not Cache County, had exclusive jurisdiction to

hear the matter.

Accordingly the order of the

District Court of Cache County had no jurisdictional basis and must be vacated.

CONCIDSION
The entire proceedings in this matter were
handled in such an unorthodox and inproper manner

19
so as to substantially impair the constitutional
rights guaranteed the api:,:>ellant, both under the
constitutions of the United States and the State
of Utah, requiring the probation revocation to
be vacated and probation reinstated.

Resi:,:>ectfully suhnitted,
STEPHEN G. BOYDEN

Attorney for Api:,:>ellant.

